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TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY
15, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

REF: STATE 13111 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 005)
10 GENEVA 63 (SFO-GVA-VIII-006)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-050.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 15, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr.
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the U.S. side discussed initial
written guidance from Washington that identified several
problematic issues. The Russian side claimed the United States was
proposing to change dramatically the decisions agreed in Moscow and
emphasized that its position on the issue of telemetry exchange had
not and would not change. End summary.

14. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Guidance From Washington; Problematic Issues; Russia's Position Would Not Change; Encryption and Exchange; and SCDM Telemetry.

Guidance From Washington

15. (S) Mr. Siemon stated the U.S. delegation had received initial written guidance from Washington (Ref A) that identified several problematic issues, although it had not yet received a proposal for Protocol or Annex text. Siemon anticipated receiving text from Washington before the week was over and hoped to provide a U.S. proposal by the end of the week. He indicated the U.S. proposal would be along the lines of the paragraph order of the Russian proposal, but would not include bracketed Russian-proposed Protocol text.

PROBLEMATIC ISSUES

16. (S) Siemon indicated the problematic issues identified by Washington involved areas that had been discussed in previous working group meetings. The main areas of concern related to how the exchange of telemetric data actually took place. The exchange process was a subject for these negotiations and should continue to be a subject for discussion during the annual telemetry reviews. The United States believed the sides could discuss concerns and make proposals for changes during annual telemetry reviews; but until there was agreement by the sides on changes, the existing telemetry exchange procedures would continue. The United States also believed launches on which telemetry was exchanged should be the subject for discussion during the annual reviews.

17. (S) It was the U.S. position that the sides would discuss how to implement the concept for an exchange on a parity basis. Siemon believed parity in this process would come into play several times in the U.S. proposal. The concept for parity in the exchange of telemetry involved an opportunity for the receiving Party to indicate those flight tests where it would like to receive telemetry with a right of refusal provision for the testing Party. In the U.S. concept the receiving Party would indicate the launches of the other Party for which it wanted telemetric data exchanged. The testing Party would then have the right to deny the exchange for an agreed number of the requested flight tests. In this way the testing Party would have the ultimate determination on which flights telemetric data would be exchanged. This right to refuse exchange on a certain number of launches would permit the testing Party the capability to protect information it believed sensitive and allows the testing Party to determine those flight tests where an exchange would take place.

18. (S) Siemon stated that it would be preferable to discuss the exchange at the beginning of the year when the flight tests would take place, but the United States could be flexible and hold these discussions at the annual review immediately following the year in question. In addition, the United States believed the exchange of telemetry should include telemetry on the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) and interpretive data on acceleration and separation times.

Russia's Position Would Not Change

¶9. (S) Siemon noted there were significant differences in the approaches of the two sides. Once he had the opportunity to review the language Washington provided he would know how significant the differences were. Siemon intended to provide the Russian side language for both a U.S.-proposed Protocol and Annex. He indicated the U.S. side would be flexible about which formulations would be included in the Protocol and Annex, also which formulations needed

to be discussed in the annual review and within the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

¶10. (S) Poznikhir stated that after listening to these points he believed the United States wanted to retain START's telemetry regime; if not in its entirety then the majority of its provisions. Moreover, he believed the United States wanted to control the exchange of telemetric information; to tell Russia on which flights telemetry would be exchanged.

¶11. (S) Poznikhir reminded the U.S. side that the Russian Federation had shown flexibility and reflected a compromise toward the U.S. position. When negotiations began the U.S. side only wanted a reference made to telemetry in the Articles. Now the United States wanted telemetry in its entirety. However, Russia would not allow this to happen. Russia's fundamental position was that the side that conducted the launch had the exclusive right to determine those launches where telemetric data would be exchanged. Given this position, he could not understand how the receiving Party could have a part in this determination.

¶12. (S) Siemon clarified the U.S. concept. After a Party conducted a launch the other Party would indicate that it wanted the telemetry from the launch. This would happen on no more than five launches per year. The Party that conducted the launch would then have the right to deny the request and there would be a quota for the number of such denials.

¶13. (S) Poznikhir concluded that the United States proposed to change the decisions that had been made during the January Admiral Mullen-General Makarov meetings in Moscow. According to the arrangements decided in Moscow, the launches for which telemetric information would be provided would be determined solely by the conducting Party. So now the Russian side had to report back to Moscow that the U.S. side had dramatically changed the position that had been agreed during the Mullen-Makarov meetings.

¶14. (S) Siemon disagreed. He noted that the sides had agreed to include three paragraphs in the draft Protocol on the Exchange of Telemetry. Siemon read the text for the three paragraphs.

Begin text:

From the entry into force of the treaty, the Parties shall exchange telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no more than five launches per year of ICBMs and SLBMs.

The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out for an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted by both sides, and in an agreed amount.

On an annual basis, the sides shall review the conditions and method of further telemetric information exchange on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Additional details on the telemetry exchange are contained in the Annex on Telemetry Exchange Procedures.

End text.

¶15. (S) Siemon noted that in the small group discussions held in Moscow, the Russian side agreed to the three paragraphs and indicated it intended to table additional language in Geneva on how the exchange would occur in practice. The sides also discussed ten elements from a Russian working draft of the Protocol. The U.S. side had understood that these points would be provided in Geneva and also understood they could be changed as a result of a Russian interagency review by the time the sides reconvened in Geneva. The summary prepared by the U.S. delegation at the conclusion of the Mullen-Makarov Moscow meetings describing the ten elements of the initial Russian draft follows:

Begin text:

The Russian side indicated it intends to table additional Telemetry Protocol language in Geneva, and discussed the following elements from their current working draft.

- The side conducting the test launch would determine the five telemetric exchanges on a parity basis.
- Each Party would have the right to raise concerns about the exchanged telemetric information.
- The exchange would be for an equal number of test launches with an agreed volume of information. Both the volume and type of exchanged information would be agreed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).
- A schedule of projected yearly test launches would be exchanged within the first 65 days of each calendar year.
- The sides would meet in the BCC on an annual basis to review the conditions for the exchange of telemetric information.
- A BCC agreement would be required to modify the telemetric information exchange agreement.

- The exchange of telemetric information would include all information broadcast during flight tests and from encapsulated information. Data denial techniques would be banned. Recording and broadcasting data on the functioning of the stages and self contained dispensing mechanism from a reentry vehicle would also be banned.

- Interpretative data would be provided by the testing Party and would include the type of ICBM or SLBM, the identification number, the date of launch, recording frequencies, and modulation methods.

- The Party conducting the test launch would determine the method for recording telemetric information.

- Each Party would provide the means to acquire playback equipment to reproduce telemetric information from recorded media.

End text.

¶16. (S) Poznikhir remarked that Siemon failed to include in the agreed paragraphs the paragraph that specified the exclusive right of the Party conducting the launches to determine on which launches telemetric data would be exchanged. He produced a paper that was provided to the Russian side on January 23, 2010, after the Moscow meetings with the text reported above indicating the sides had agreed to this paragraph and therefore could not agree that the U.S. side did not understand Russia's position on the exchange of telemetry.

¶17. (S) Siemon noted that the ten elements that were shown at the end of the paper were not agreed points but were a summary of the points that Russia had described as drafts that might be included in a draft proposal for exchange in Geneva.

¶18. (S) Poznikhir stated that the exclusive right paragraph was the fundamental position of the Russian Federation, the position had not changed and he had been consistent in presenting this position to the U.S. side. Siemon believed the difference in understanding was based on differing perceptions on what had been agreed to during the Moscow meetings. Poznikhir disagreed and reiterated that he believed the U.S. side was changing what had

already been decided in Moscow and had been reported to the respective Presidents. He emphatically stated that the Russian side would not discuss any changes to its position. The U.S. side had to either agree to the current Russian proposal or Russia would be required to change its approach to telemetry.

¶19. (S) Siemon stated that he believed neither side had been intentionally deceitful during the Moscow meetings. The sides had a different belief on what they thought had been agreed and what they expected to see in the other side's proposal once it arrived in Geneva. Both sides had redlines. For the Russian side it was the exclusive right to determine flights for which telemetry would be exchanged. For the U.S. side, it was the idea that the receiving Party should also have a part in this determination. The U.S. side had to justify the telemetry exchange in the ratification process and if the exchange was one-sided then it could not be

justified as a meaningful exchange. Both sides were required to compromise during negotiations. The U.S. side had started the negotiations with positions it did not believe it would change, yet it did change positions to move toward a compromise. The Russian side had also made changes to move toward a compromise.

¶20. (S) Poznikhir stated that the original position of the Russian side was that there would be no telemetry exchange in the new treaty and it had moved from this position as a compromise.

Encryption and Exchange

¶21. (S) Mr. Shevchenko indicated he could not understand how encryption was possible if a situation existed in which the receiving Party had a part in determining the launches on which to exchange telemetry. The Russian side had stated that it intended to encrypt telemetry on every launch other than the five to be exchanged. This could not be possible if the receiving Party had a part in the determination. Siemon stated that the sides had not agreed that all launches other than the five to be exchanged would be encrypted. What had been agreed was the right of the Party to encrypt as it so wished. Shevchenko reiterated the Russian position that there would not be encryption on any of the five launches on which data would be exchanged; however, the Russian side planned to encrypt all other launches.

¶22. (S) Poznikhir noted that what the sides had agreed was that on the launches on which telemetry would be exchanged the Parties would not impede getting access to the data; in other words, no encryption, encapsulation, jamming or use of narrow directional beaming. Russia would have the right to encrypt all other launches.

SCDM TELEMETRY

¶23. (S) Referencing the exchange of telemetry from the SCDM, Poznikhir reminded the U.S. side that even Russian Prime Minister Putin had expressed his ideas on this exchange. He stated clearly that the Russian side would not exchange SCDM telemetry. Russia would not exchange information the U.S side could use to build its missile defense system when Russia was not building a missile defense system of its own and therefore could not benefit from the exchange. Poznikhir noted that the Russian side had proposed an Agreed Statement that would resolve this issue. The Agreed Statement included text in which the sides agreed that telemetric information about ICBM and SLBM launches of the other Party, received independently or within the framework of a bilateral exchange, would not be used for purposes related to the development, increase in capability, or modernization of missile defense systems. The text of the Russian Agreed Statement proposal on the use of telemetry for missile defense purposes follows:

Begin text:

Document of the Russian side

February 9, 2010

Agreed Statement

On the Use of Telemetric Information

Considering that the exchange of telemetric information on missile launches of the Parties is a sensitive transparency measure, which, under specific circumstances, is capable of inflicting harm on the national security of a Party, the United States of America and the Russian Federation agree that telemetric information about ICBM and SLBM launches of the other Party, received independently or within the framework of a bilateral exchange, shall not be used for purposes related to the development, increase in capability, or modernization of missile defense systems.

End text.

¶24. (S) Additionally, President Medvedev offered to provide SCDM

telemetry if the United States would provide telemetry on the homing guidance system of its ground-base interceptor (GBI) launches; this would ensure parity. Poznikhir stated that the Russian side was ready to discuss the exchange of SCDM telemetry if the United States was willing to agree to exchange GBI telemetry. Siemon did not believe the concept of exchanging SCDM telemetry for homing guidance was in the current Russian proposal, to which Poznikhir stated that the position on not exchanging SCDM telemetry was the Russian position, the rest of the position was his personal view. Siemon said he would report this back to Washington and carefully indicate that this was Poznikhir's personal view and not the position of the Russian side.

¶25. (S) Poznikhir asked Siemon to also report back to Washington the Russian position on the exclusive right of the Party conducting the launches to determine on which launches telemetric data would be exchanged, that no SCDM or re-entry vehicle telemetry would be exchanged and that no stage separation or acceleration data would be exchanged. He again emphasized the U.S. proposal was not acceptable to Russia. Shevchenko summarized Poznikhir's position: Russia's position on telemetry had not changed and was not going to change.

¶26. (U) Documents provided: None.

¶27. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Siemon

Mr. Dean

Lt Col Goodman

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Ms. Pura

Dr. Ringenberg

Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Poznikhir

Ms. Fuzhenkova

Lt Col Lyzsovskiy

Col Kamenskiy

Mr. Shevchenko

Mr. Voloskov

Col Zaistev

Ms. Komshilova (Int)

128. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS